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Within James Joyce’s Ulysses, animal imagery and animal-human interaction 
operate as encoded discussions of speech/speechlessness and language’s significance 
to one’s existential status. Though there are myriad animal references throughout 
Ulysses, dogs, cats, and the lamb figure of Rudy will be the primary focus, as these are 
the interactions that most directly force Joyce’s characters to interpret the contents of 
the inner non-human animal.  From Stephen projecting his morbidity onto the dog in 
Proteus to Bloom projecting his fears about Molly onto his cat in Calypso, understanding 
the animal translates into an attempt to understand one’s own relationship to humanity. 
In the most potent of these examples, Bloom’s infant son Rudy more closely resembles 
an animal than a human in his complete speechlessness, problematizing the 
subsequent response to his death. Bloom and Molly’s marriage suffers primarily over 
their differing ways of mourning for, in the words of Molly, “what was neither one thing 
nor the other” (Joyce 637). Rudy’s tragic, speechless ending necessitates exhaustive 
interpretation for his parents, with the most biting question being, did he suffer? In the 
wake of Rudy’s death, Bloom and Molly grow so alien to one another that they too 
become, in the realm of their marital relationship, speechless. As critic David Rando 
suggests, “in a book in which even a cap and a fan can speak and in which a dog can 
write and recite poetry, Rudy Bloom is singularly speechless” (Rando 538). The 
unintelligible “Mrkrgnao” of Bloom’s cat reflects the language of Ulysses, Bloom’s 
ineffective attempts at communication, Molly’s inner-monologue, and most tragically, the 
cries of Rudy. 
In his essay “Hume on the Moral Difference between Humans and Other 
Animals,” Denis Arnold attempts to synthesize the work done by Hume on differentiating 
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human and animal. The 18th century philosopher’s ruminations on animals were 
motivated in large part by his desire to analyze and define human nature. Beginning his 
essay, Arnold writes, “In the Treatise and both of the Enquiries, as well as in various 
essays, Hume appeals to comparisons between humans and other animals to support 
his analyses of human reason, human sympathy, the human passions, and human 
morality” (Arnold 303). He goes on to suggest that Hume uses animals as a model to 
demonstrate what animals lack, and subsequently what humans have. Hume departed 
from the ideas of Descartes and acknowledged that animals do hold a certain degree of 
reason, albeit quite different from human reason (Arnold 307). Despite the difference, 
Hume believed that reason alone failed to satisfy the overarching distinction between 
man and animal. Instead, he suggested that the core difference existed in something he 
referred to as “the sentiment of humanity.” In Hume’s second Enquiry, he describes this 
sentiment:  
[It] cannot be disputed, that there is some benevolence, 
however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of 
friendship for human kind; some particle of the dove 
kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf 
and serpent. Let these generous sentiments be supposed 
ever so weak; let them be insufficient to move even a hand 
or finger of our body, they must still direct the determinations 
of our mind, and where everything else is equal, produce a 
cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to 
mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. (Arnold 
309) 
 
While Hume resists defining the human-animal distinction as the ability to sympathize, it 
is a sort of global empathy that exists at the heart of Hume’s “sentiment of humanity.” 
Moreover, human perception of other humans as possessing the same agreeable 
qualities causes a kinship and subsequently an emotional attachment. 
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In more recent scholarship, Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s “The Open: 
Man and Animal” explores the relationship between, and distinction within, man and 
animal. In the first of two epigraphs that begin the book, Agamben quotes Georges-
Louis Buffon: “If animals did not exist, the nature of man would be even more 
incomprehensible” (Agamben). In this epigraph, it is implicit that animal’s 
meaningfulness resides at least somewhat in their utility as human foils—a way to think 
about human nature as special in comparison to the animal. Hume goes on to discuss 
the differences in regards to animal and human experience of their respective 
perceptions. Borrowing from Heidegger, Agamben suggests that the animal 
experiences a “poverty in world,” which prevents it from having access to the human 
world of concealment and revelation. In the book’s fifteenth chapter, “World and Earth,” 
Agamben uses Heidegger’s ideas to formulate a distinction between man and animal 
based on the idea of disclosure—the ability to disclose an absolute truth about one’s 
being. The world, as a human realm open in the sense of its community and culture, is 
accessible only by human sensibility. On the other hand, the earth, roughly defined as 
the natural, is essentially closed in terms of its inability to unveil any truth about itself. 
Quoting Heidegger, Agamben writes:  
The stone is worldless. Plant and animal likewise have no 
world; but they belong to the veiled throng of an environment 
in which they hang suspended. The peasant woman, on the 
other hand, has a world because she dwells in the open of 
beings…’ World and earth, openness and closedness—
though opposed in an essential conflict—are, however, 
never separable: ‘The Earth is the spontaneous emerging 
toward nothing of that which constantly closes itself and thus 
saves itself. World and earth are essentially different from 
one another and yet are never separated. The world grounds 
itself on the earth, and the earth juts through world. 
(Agamben 51) 
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Agamben suggests that the “earth” is comprised of those who are “closed” in 
themselves. Animals, in the idea that humans cannot penetrate their experience of the 
world, are necessarily “closed” from outside understanding and unable to disclose any 
absolute truth in regards to their nature. However, Heidegger also suggests, as does 
Agamben, that the “truth” at the center of humanity, starts first in the non-truth of the 
closed animal—a sort of potentiality traversed only by the evolution of non-human 
animal to humanity. Attempting to understand this non-truth, or closedness, at the 
center of the non-human animal is what drives both interpretation of the animal and 
introspection of oneself among Joyce’s characters.   
During Proteus, while walking on Sandymount Strand, Stephen has the first 
meaningful animal encounter of the novel. Shortly after seeing a dead dog carcass in 
the sand, Stephen sees another dog, this time alive, running toward him. Though 
Stephen addresses the canine from a distance, he nonetheless attempts to understand 
the dog’s motives. Considering this, he thinks, “Lord, is he going to attack me” (Joyce 
37). As soon as the dog is in sight, Stephen begins attributing to the dog his own fears 
about them, assuming the dog will attack him. Part of this response may stem from 
Joyce’s own commonly known fear of dogs, but also from the general social stigma of 
canine aggression. Stephen takes these interpretations a step further than Bloom does 
later with his cat, as the dog gives no interpretable signs to suggest he will attack. 
Stephen’s thoughts about the dog are generated purely from his own consciousness 
and his own fears. In Ulysses: A Casebook, Derek Attridge suggests, “In portraying the 
unreflective and animal, the text undoes our belief in the natural by circling us back to 
the social and to a language that purposefully confuses nature and culture” (Attridge 
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67). This confusion of nature and culture, a result of the need for animal interpretation 
and interpretation’s inevitable bias, continues in the scene as Stephen watches the 
dog’s movements on the beach. Standing still in observation, Stephen thinks, “Their dog 
ambled about a bank of dwindling sand, trotting, sniffing on all sides. Looking for 
something lost in a past life. Suddenly he made off like a bounding hare, ears flung 
back, chasing the shadow of a lowskimming gull” (Joyce 38). While the first and last 
descriptions of the dog’s behavior seem consistent, Stephen also includes an idea 
clearly in line with his stream-of-conscious narration—the looking for something in a 
past life. Having recently lost his mother, he appears to be grasping for a lost stability he 
had before his mother’s death. Seeing the dog “sniffing on all sides” reminds him of his 
own search for stability, which he then applies to the dog. The unreflective, speechless 
dog forces Stephen to forego the natural for the social, which in this case manifests as 
Stephen’s attempt to process his grief. Granted, there is something sad about nature 
itself, as Rando writes quoting Walter Benjamin, “Because she is mute, nature mourns” 
(Rando 536).  
As the dog comes upon the dead dog carcass, a scene clearly meant to mirror 
Stephen’s own experience with his mother’s corpse, the dog sniffs, stalks, and noses 
the corpse to understand what he sees. Stephen, imagining what the dog must be 
thinking, says to himself, “Ah, poor dogsbody! Here lies poor dogsbody’s body” (Joyce 
39). The assumption that Stephen makes here, in imagining how the canine might react 
to death, suggests that the dog has some fundamental understanding of death. It is 
possible that Stephen assumes this because the dog is symbolically closer to death, in 
its lack of speech and lack of self-awareness, than any human could be. Interestingly, 
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while Stephen at least analyzes the scene and considers what the dog might be 
thinking, the dog’s owners, impatient with animal speechlessness, chide him for his 
curiosity.  When they see the dog sniffing around the carcass, they yell out, “Tatters! 
Outofthat, you mongrel!” (Joyce 39). Differing from Stephen’s analysis of the scene, the 
owners just want the dog to stay away from the rotten, likely diseased body. Thoughts 
about whether Tatters can understand death, or if he recognized the carcass as the 
dead of his kind, do not cross the minds of the two owners. The dog reacts to the 
chiding by “skulking back to his master,” where a “blunt bootless kick sent him 
unscathed across a spit of sand, crouched in flight” (Joyce 39). Confident in their 
superiority, the owners essentially punish the dog for his inability to respond with 
reason. Either unaware of his state of servitude, or aware of his inability to explain 
himself, Tatters resorts to urinating and digging a hole. Seeing the urination and digging 
as coping and calming devices used by Tatters after being scolded, Stephen remarks to 
himself, “The simple pleasures of the poor” (Joyce 39).  
Stephen continues to look on as the dog “dabbles and delves” in the sand, and 
again, Stephen places himself in the “dogsbody,” thinking, “Something he buried there, 
his grandmother” (Joyce 39). Remembering the answer to the riddle he spoke of in 
Nestor, “The fox burying its grandmother under a hollybush,” Stephen reverts once 
more to his own dead mother. In fact, the entire scene in which Stephen attempts to 
analyze Tatter’s actions on the beach, he is inadvertently attributing his own tendencies 
and anxieties to the dog. Unable to express anything true about his reactions to the 
carcass on the beach, the dog’s intended purpose is limited to the perspectives of 
Stephen and its owners, both of whom fail to recognize the dog’s unreachable interior. 
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In the Homeric parallel, Proteus is a god of the sea, who is at once both a holder of true 
knowledge and a shapeshifting deceiver (Burns 970, 971).  While Stephen ponders the 
truths and untruths of the world in Proteus, he agonizes over the unattainability of 
absolute truth. The dog, who may be the shapeshifting Proteus himself, symbolizes this 
vain attempt at finding truth, deceiving Stephen by appearing in a speechless, 
impenetrable form. If Stephen connects with the dog in any meaningful way in his 
mission for truth, it is when he also urinates on the beach, momentarily foregoing the 
dark, grandiose thoughts of the chapter and engaging in a simple, animal pleasure.  
In a passage of lighter tone, Bloom shares the company of several men in a pub, 
one of whom, referred to as ‘the Citizen,” is accompanied by a “bloody mangy mongrel, 
Garryowen” (Joyce 242). The unknown narrator of this chapter holds the power to 
portray and describe Garryowen, and does so via cultural interpretations. He begins by 
remarking, “Be a corporal work of mercy if someone would take the life of that bloody 
dog. I’m told for a fact he ate a good part of the breeches off a constabulary man…that 
came round one time with a blue paper about a license” (Joyce 243). In the phrase “I’m 
told for a fact,” mythmaking is inherently present. The man was presumably told a story, 
taken for fact, that he now uses to define the dog’s nature. This characterization of 
Garryowen continues in a section of hyperbolic parody that reads: 
while at his feet reposed a savage animal of the canine tribe 
whose stertorous gasps announced that he was sunk in 
uneasy slumber, a supposition confirmed by hoarse growls 
and spasmodic movements which his master repressed from 
time to time by tranquilizing blows of a mighty cudgel rudely 
fashioned out of Paleolithic stone. (Joyce 244) 
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Humorously, Garryowen is described as “savage” and deserving of murder, despite him 
simply sleeping by his master. Though his slumber is “uneasy” and he lets out “hoarse 
growls,” this seems inefficient to suggest savagery. Granted, next to the chapter’s 
tongue-in-cheek Irish hero, the Citizen, the situation necessitates a description of 
Garryowen as tribal, spasmodic, and dangerous. This attribution of savagery continues 
throughout the chapter, with the narrator referring to training dogs by kindness as 
“drivel,” and describing Garryowen’s tongue as “hanging out of him a yard long or more” 
(Joyce 251). The narrator consistently uses his own cultural knowledge to describe the 
dog as savage, despite no grounded basis for the interpretations.  
Nonetheless, Garryowen’s status as a “mongrel,” in a chapter that concerns 
“nationalism and history,” surpasses simple explanations of the narrator’s observations 
as misunderstanding the dog’s nature. In his essay “Garryowen and the Bloody Mangy 
Mongrel of Irish Modernity,” Sam Slote argues that Garryowen is a representation of 
Irish national identity, albeit a stereotypical representation. Of Garryowen’s name, Slote 
writes: 
…the name Garryowen is fitting because it combines the title 
of a popular Irish roistering song—to go with the national 
context—and the filthy associations of Garryowen, the 
suburb of Limerick which the song celebrates. Garryowen is 
thus the perfect figure for raucous, thuggish Irish 
nationalism, his mongrel status no accidental attribute (Slote 
548).  
 
Thus, the reader begins to understand Garryowen both as a dog and as a symbol for 
the savage nationalism espoused in the chapter. Because the Citizen himself 
symbolizes this, Garryowen is easily utilized as a mirror of the Citizen due to his 
speechlessness and inability to object. The climactic moment of this characterization 
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comes when Garryowen transforms into Owen Garry, “the famous old Irish red setter 
wolfdog formerly known by the sobriquet Garryowen,” who proceeds to recite a Celtic 
Irish poem. One of the jokes here, buried under a hyperbolic newspaper story 
describing Owen Garry’s poetic career, is that Owen Garry has not penned a poem in 
human language, but rather in the “metrical system of the canine” (Joyce 256). The 
narrator of the section suggests just before the poem, “Perhaps it should be added that 
the effect is greatly increased if Owen’s verse be spoken somewhat slowly and 
indistinctly in a tone suggestive of suppressed rancor” (Joyce 256). Suppressed rancor 
seems to be alluding to a growl, making the entire poem an interpretation of his growling 
in response to the Citizen. Of this scene, Slote comments, “Garryowen, or rather Owen 
Garry, here becomes representative of the Irishman: a dog waxing eloquent in Irish. 
Owen Garry's verse, we are told, ‘bears a striking resemblance (the italics are ours) to 
the ranns of ancient Celtic bards’” (Slote 551). Even as an Irishman with the gift of 
poetic recitation, the dog is nonetheless still just a dog asking for water. The 
interpretation of his growls as Celtic poetry is not the “spread of human culture among 
the lower animals,” but rather the attribution of human culture to animals. This attribution 
continues throughout the chapter, as the unnamed narrator continually applies features 
to the dog that he does not quite deserve.  
At a later point in the chapter, the narrator reports, “and the Citizen scowling after 
him and the dog at his feet looking up to know who to bite and when” (Joyce 266). 
Though it seems the narrator is applying this type of characterization unfairly from his 
own biases, one must consider, maybe Garryowen is a dangerous, scary, mangy 
mongrel. However, during Gerty McDowell’s narration, this possibility is problematized. 
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Being the Citizen’s niece, Gerty knows Garryowen and presumably would have spent 
some time with him. In both an attempt to complicate the interpretations of Garryowen’s 
nature and reference his poetic gift, Gerty remarks, “and the photograph of grandpa 
Giltrap’s lovely dog Garryowen that almost talked it was so human” (Joyce 289). To this 
point of different perspectives, or of parallax, Slote describes several animals in the 
book as “plural,” meaning they are described in different ways throughout the novel 
depending on who is doing the describing. Given that these animals are, for the most 
part, speechless, this plurality must be a direct result of interpretations coming from 
different perspectives. Commenting on this plurality, Slote writes: 
Like the Citizen and the metamorphosing dogs in ‘Proteus,’ 
and ‘Circe,’ Garryowen is himself plural. When first espied, 
the narrator describes him as a ‘bloody mangy mongrel.’ On 
the other hand…Garryowen is ‘a savage animal of the 
canine tribe whose stertorous gasps announced that he was 
sunk in uneasy slumber…In the following episode, 
‘Nausicaa,’ another variant perspective is proferred: Gerty 
McDowell, in the festering mawkishness of the episode’s 
style, describes him as ‘grandpa Giltrap’s lovely dog 
Garryowen that almost talked it was so human.’ The dog is 
then mongrelized through the multiplicity of perspectives 
brought to bear upon him (Slote 550).  
 
As one of the more complicated animal interactions in the novel, Garryowen remains a 
dog that cannot talk and cannot insist on his own characterization. His reputation relies 
on interpretation and mythmaking, the consequences of existing without language. 
By the dreamlike Circe episode, both Stephen and Bloom have encountered 
dogs over the course of the day. Being both a synthesis and perversion of the day’s 
events, as dreams are, Circe’s dog figures are a reflection of previous intersections of 
humanity and animality, as well as of literal dogs from earlier in the novel. The first dog 
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encounter occurs as Stephen and Lynch wander on Mecklenburgh Street. The scene, 
written in the form of stage directions, reads, “(He flourishes his ashplant, shivering the 
lamp image, shattering light over the world. A liver and white spaniel on the prowl slinks 
after him, growling. Lynch scares it with a kick)” (Joyce 353). The scene here mirrors 
Stephen’s previous encounter with the dog in Proteus, who appears to him as similarly 
menacing. As is the case before, Stephen’s fear of dogs defines and influences his 
experience of them, both in his mode of thinking and in the dog’s behavior. In what 
seems like free indirect discourse, the stage directions appear to be describing the dog 
as Stephen sees it—“on the prowl,” “slinking,” and “growling” (Joyce 353). Immediately 
following this interaction is Stephen musing over the nature of language, as he looks 
back at the defeated canine just kicked by Lynch. To Lynch, Stephen proposes, “So that 
gesture, not music not odour, would be a universal language, the gift of tongues 
rendering visible not the lay sense but the first entelechy, the structural rhythm” (Joyce 
353). He ponders the possibility of gesture, rather than speech, serving as the 
communicative tool of all beings. By replacing speech with gesture, Stephen imagines a 
world in which animals and humans could speak to one another. In this scenario, the 
dog Lynch so promptly kicked may have been able to explain why he was approaching, 
rather than having his intentions made opaque by speechlessness.  
Equally important, though, is the second half of Stephen’s statement, in which he 
elevates speech to a divine level. With gesture covering the “lay sense,” speech 
becomes a surrogate for the soul, the “first entelechy” (Joyce 353). In this formulation, 
humans would be freed from the burden of interpretation, enabling them to converse 
with species of all natures, while simultaneously affirming human dominion over all 
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others as the ones bearing a soul. Earlier in the novel, the reader learns of Stephen’s 
refusal to pray over his dying mother. Driven by his struggle with religious belief, 
Stephen simply cannot bring himself to pray, despite the insurmountable guilt this 
causes him. By imagining a world in which the soul is made visible by one’s words, 
Stephen imagines a world in which he is free to pray over his mother. It would no longer 
be necessary to mock the Catholic Church, since he would be inherently sure of his soul 
and of God. Although this section appears before the episode turns truly dreamlike, 
Stephen’s discussion of language is a sort of daydream, in which animal interpretation 
is unnecessary and the human soul is a given.  
The next Circe canine encounter, this time with Bloom, features a dog from 
earlier in the novel—Garryowen. Differing greatly from Stephen’s experience with the 
spaniel, Garryowen approaches Bloom with “his tongue outlolling, panting” (Joyce 369). 
The difference between the two descriptions lies more in the disparity between Bloom 
and Stephen’s animal interpretations than it does in the difference between the dog’s 
personalities. When juxtaposed with the earlier rendering of Garryowen’s personality as 
a “savage animal,” the dog’s actions here display that Joyce’s animals take on the 
personality attributed to them. Bloom might wonder whether Garryowen is “mad,” but he 
nonetheless speaks to him in a friendly tone, coaxing the dog with “Good fellow! Fido! 
Good fellow! Garryowen!” (Joyce 370). Regretting his earlier decision to buy the meat, 
Bloom wonders what to do with it. In a performative gesture, the dog “drives a cold 
snivelling muzzle against his hand, wagging his tail” (Joyce 369). The dog’s nuzzling 
presents Bloom with the task of interpretation—is the dog being affectionate, hungry, or 
some combination of the two? Comparing canine tendencies to female tendencies, 
15 
 
Bloom uses his interpretive power to assume that dogs like “rencontres,” or chance 
meetings (Joyce 370, Gifford 461). In making this assumption, Bloom inadvertently 
suggests that he understands as much about dogs as he does about women, which is 
tragically little. It becomes clear that speechlessness and its consequences extend to 
women as well, in that Bloom struggles to understand what it means to be a woman, 
and by extension, what women enjoy. Both women and animals fit into a category that 
interest Bloom, but also puzzle him, and therefore require interpretive power to guess at 
their natures.  Nonetheless, while Stephen fears the dog in part because he does not 
understand it, Bloom holds no such grudge for those he does not understand. Curiosity, 
rather than fear, characterize Bloom’s approach to these problems, while Stephen 
regularly faces the latter. Bloom feeds Garryowen the meat and when accosted by the 
Watchmen, defends his actions by proclaiming, “I am doing good to others” (Joyce 370).  
The last notable instance of the canine in Circe comes as Paddy Dignam 
appears, transformed into a human-sized, corpse-like beagle. Dignam, who died a few 
days before the events of Ulysses, defends Bloom during his ridiculous mock trial, 
testifying that he saw Bloom at his funeral. However, rather than his words, Dignam’s 
appearance is of most importance in this scene. The stage directions describing him as 
he appears reads: 
The beagle lifts his snout, showing the grey scorbutic face of 
Paddy Dignam. He has gnawed all. He exhales a putrid 
carcasefed breath. He grows to human size and shape. His 
dachshund coat becomes a brown mortuary habit. His green 
eye flashes bloodshot. Half of one ear, all the nose and both 
thumbs are ghouleaten. (Joyce 385) 
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In his essay “Syphilisation and Its Discontents,” Martin Bock suggests that Dignam’s 
appearance relates to Stephen’s fear of “beastly death,” a reference to the earlier scene 
with the dead dog in Proteus (Bock 138). Assuming there is no God, something 
Stephen grapples with incessantly, the consequences of death are unknown. As death 
removes the mind and leaves just the physical body, the human is made equal with all 
other animals, or beasts. Describing Stephen’s fear, Bock writes, “Joyce’s soul-corpses 
are metonymically transmigrated: death’s disfigurement transforms the human to 
animal, to anthropomorph, and finally to ghoul. The ‘carcasefed breath’ of the beagle 
recalls the breath of ‘wetted ashes’ that characterizes the ghost of Stephen’s mother” 
(Bock 138). Struggling to accept the notion of a soul, Stephen interprets death as the 
putrid transformation into something rotten and mindless. Living primarily in his own 
mind, the thought of living without his thoughts forces him to imagine living only with 
one’s physical body, which will inevitably rot. Death, then, becomes another animal 
requiring interpretation, just as the dogs met previously in the novel had required.  
 Similar to the dogs encountered throughout Ulysses, Bloom’s cat forces him to 
explicate her feline behaviors, in turn forcing Bloom to explore his own psyche. In his 
essay “The Cat’s Meow: Ulysses, Animals, and the Veterinary Gaze,” David Rando 
writes, “[Animals] were exposed to the language of rationality and were apprehended 
through a new lens that, borrowing from Foucault, I call the ‘veterinary gaze’” (Rando 
529). In Bloom’s introductory scene, he interacts with his black cat while making 
breakfast, pondering her vocalizations, her movements, her health, and her behaviors, 
effectively applying the “veterinary gaze” that Rando refers to. As is also noted by 
Rando, Bloom pays particular attention to the cat’s vocalizations, which are 
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differentiated through three different spellings: “Mkgnao,” “Mrkgnao,” and “Mrkrgnao” 
(Joyce 45, Rando 535). Bloom understands the first vocalization as a greeting, returning 
his cat’s meow with “O, there you are…” (Joyce 45). Mimicking what he believes she’s 
thinking, he thinks, “Prr. Scratch my head. Prr.” The cat’s second vocalization comes 
after Bloom says, “Milk for the pussens,” and Bloom appears to recognize the meow as 
the cat’s excitement and desire for the milk. Following the second vocalization is a 
series of thoughts about human’s underestimation of the cat’s ability to process human 
communication. The last vocalization, which is noted to be the loudest, is uttered after 
Bloom says to the cat, “Afraid of the chickens she is. Afraid of the chookchooks. I never 
saw such a stupid pussens as the pussens” (Joyce 45). Presumably, Bloom is joking 
around with the cat, and her loud response is an acknowledgement of his jesting insult. 
Nonetheless, all of Bloom’s assumptions about the cat stem from his effort to 
understand her perspective, despite this being unattainable knowledge. At one point he 
thinks to himself, “Wonder what I look like to her” (Joyce 45). To understand her 
perspective, he must examine his own, applying human logic where he sees fit. This 
scene introduces the problem of parallax, in which an object might appear differently 
depending on the position one sees it from. When Bloom wonders what he looks like to 
the cat, he’s truly wondering how others see him, especially his wife, Molly. In the 
subsequent episode Lotus Eaters, Bloom has a similar encounter with a horse, in which 
he thinks, “Damn all they know or care about anything with their long noses stuck in 
nosebags. Too full for words. Still they get their feed all right and their doss. Gelded too: 
a stump of black gutta-percha wagging limp between their haunches. Might be happy all 
the same that way. Good poor brutes they look” (Joyce 63). Observing the horse, Bloom 
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considers the reasoning for its speechlessness, wonders about its state of nakedness, 
and pities its ignorance. But, rather than being purely observational, Bloom also 
appears to be relating how others see him throughout the day, knowing that many of the 
people he encounters around Dublin are aware of his wife’s affair with Blazes Boylan. 
Frequently thinking of food to distract himself from the coming events, Bloom resembles 
the horse who finds solace in its food. Bloom goes on to imagine others gazing at him, 
who are mindful of Molly and Blazes, thinking of him as simple and aloof. In the minds 
of passers-by, Bloom hears the echo of, “Might be happy all the same that way. Good 
poor [brute he looks]” (Joyce 63). He is attempting to measure and calculate, in social 
terms, the level of distortion that parallax introduces in attempting to analyze another’s 
character. In reflecting on his cat and on the horse, Bloom unveils parts of his 
personality that Joyce surely wanted readers to decode in an introduction to Bloom, 
including his complicated relationship with his wife, Molly, and the role parallax plays in 
their misunderstandings. 
In the middle of his interaction with the pussens, Bloom remarks to himself, “They 
understand what we say better than we understand them. She understand all she wants 
to. Vindictive too. Cruel. Her nature. Curious mice never squeal. Seem to like it” (Joyce 
45). The cat’s gender is key, as Bloom is thinking about Molly and uses the female cat 
as a proxy in his thoughts about her. To this point Rando writes, “Critics have noted how 
his thoughts about the cat shift subtly into thoughts about Molly, facilitated by the 
attribution of feline qualities to human females but also by his masochistic fantasy of 
being punished” (Rando 535-536). From his analysis of his cat pours an analysis of his 
marriage and a connection to his wife’s upcoming infidelities. It becomes clear that 
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Bloom fears the power of women and their capability for vengeance, but it is also clear 
that he enjoys this to some degree. Having committed his own infidelities, albeit less 
serious, Bloom knows Molly will respond to his extramarital activities with her own. 
Nonetheless, beneath his sadness and anxiety, there is taboo excitement. This 
masochism becomes an integral part of Bloom’s complex characterization, complicating 
one of the novel’s central problems—Molly’s affair with Blazes Boylan. Bloom projects 
all of these sharply human feelings onto his cat, who seems only to be performing for 
her milk and her food, unaware of the traits being assigned her.  
In her essay “Art and Life, Nature and Culture,” Cheryl Herr suggests that 
Bloom’s interactions with the cat parallel his early morning interactions with Molly (Herr 
66). Of this parallel, Herr aptly explains, “Molly’s twice repeated ‘Poldy’ and insistence 
that he hurry with the tea are forms of mild anxious, aggressive purring. Bloom ‘calmly’ 
gazes at Molly’s ‘large, soft bubs, sloping within her nightdress like a shegoats udder,’ 
much as he observes the cats whiskers and sheen…Molly drinks her tea with a degree 
of self-absorption also found in the milk lapping ‘pussens’ (Herr 66). In fact, Molly’s first 
sound of the novel, “Mn,” is a seemingly shortened but undifferentiated form of 
“Mkgnao” (Joyce 46). From the similarities between Molly and the cat, one might 
consider the way in which Molly’s inner nature is just as inaccessible to Bloom as the 
cat’s is. From her monologue in “Penelope,” Molly shows the reader the multitudes of 
thoughts being kept from Bloom, making their relationship one in which each partner 
has to interpret the other’s inner nature. Hauntingly, this is the same dilemma causing 
the rift in their opinions about Rudy and his inaccessibility. Bloom’s interactions with 
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Molly and with the cat foreground the rest of the novel in terms of what is and what is 
not accessible.  
An equally important aspect of Joyce’s choosing to introduce Bloom through an 
interaction with a cat is expressed by Rando, as he writes, “Joyce's decision to 
introduce Bloom and the cat together is also a stroke of thematic economy because the 
interspecies encounter foregrounds language and speechlessness” (Rando 536). This 
speechlessness highlighted by Rando is a theme that haunts Bloom throughout 
Ulysses. The constant need to analyze, often resulting in over-analysis, frames Bloom’s 
encounters with countless characters in the novel. His ride to Paddy Dignam’s funeral, 
his attempts at conversation with Stephen, his inability to contribute at Barney Kiernan’s 
pub, his failure to properly communicate with Molly, and most importantly his dead 
infant son all represent the problem of speechlessness, whether literal or just his failure 
to communicate. At one point during the “Nausicaa” episode, Bloom thinks to himself, 
“Metempsychosis. They believed you could be changed into a tree from grief” (Joyce 
309). Considering that a tree is an object of nature belonging to what Agamben says 
Heidegger would label “earth,” a speechless entity closed in itself, it is possible that 
Ulysses aims to document Bloom’s struggle against becoming speechless in the face of 
grief.  
In his essay, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” philosopher Jacques Derrida 
provides his own commentary on the relationship between man and non-human 
animal—specifically between man and cat. In the first pages of the essay, Derrida 
considers the effect of the animal stare: “Since time, therefore. Since so long ago, can 
we say that the animal has been looking at us? What animal? The other. I often ask 
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myself, just to see, who I am—and who I am (following) at the moment when, caught 
naked, in silence, by the gaze of an animal, for example the eyes of a cat, I have 
trouble, yes, a bad time overcoming my embarrassment” (Derrida 372). Speaking of 
both literal and figurative nudity, Derrida wonders how the animal gaze manages to strip 
the human down, crossing the existential lines that divide human and non-human 
animal. He aptly describes how the speechless animal gaze is at the root of humanity’s 
interpretative failure, writing, “We could nickname this denuded passivity with a term 
that will come back more than once…seeing oneself seen naked under a gaze that is 
vacant to the extent of being bottomless, at the same time innocent and cruel, perhaps 
sensitive and impassive, good and bad, uninterpretable, unreadable, undecidable, 
abyssal and secret” (Derrida 381). The “secret” that Derrida refers to forces humans to 
imagine its contents, to interpret and decide, to assign a personality and nature to the 
animal other, but also to assign a nature to oneself. Toward the end of the essay, 
Derrida asks his readers, “But cannot this cat also be, deep within her eyes, my primary 
mirror?” (Derrida 418). Analyzing the animal becomes not only an exploration in the 
delineations of human and nonhuman, but also an exploration into one’s own place in 
those delineations—one’s place among humankind. Still, there are consequences for 
the animal in its passive engagement with this analysis. Both Garryowen, Bloom’s cat, 
and the dog on the beach are victims of this unfair human judgment, which strips them 
of their own expression in exchange for understanding the self. However, human 
interpretation stripping animals of their expression becomes problematized when one 
considers the opposite situation, in which humans do no interpreting whatsoever. 
Addressing this issue of human disconnection from animal, Derrida writes:  
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But in forbidding myself thus to assign, interpret or project, 
must I conversely give in to the other violence or stupidity, 
that which would consist in suspending one's compassion 
and in depriving the animal of every power of manifestation, 
of the desire to manifest to me anything at all, and even to 
manifest to me in some way its experience of my language, of 
my words and of my nudity? (Derrida 387)  
 
In other words, if animal silence inherently effaces any true human understanding of 
their intentions and experience, then that would seem to strip animals of their ability to 
express experience even more. Expression, then, becomes a paradox in which animal 
speechlessness both prevents the non-human animal from expressing oneself and the 
human from interpreting any attempt at non-human animal expression. Further, it blurs 
the lines between human and non-human animal existence, essentially muddying the 
definitions of humanity derived from juxtaposition with perceived animal expression. 
Derrida goes on to question the idea of “animal” as an all-encompassing term, “as if all 
nonhuman living things could be grouped without the common sense of this 
‘commonplace,’ the Animal” (Derrida 402). Given the failure of non-human animal as a 
general term, animal expression becomes a singularity, no longer able to be used as 
the tool by which humans note our different, higher natures. Language as a dividing 
concept between human and animal is also challenged by the potential individuality of 
the animal, and the potential for thought beyond language. Derrida’s question of, “What 
this animal is, what it will have been, what it would, would like to, or could be,” is made 
inaccessible to humans through lack of common language, but hints at an existence 
beyond language.  
In considering the consequences of speechlessness and lack-of-language, it 
seems prudent to determine what language encompasses. In his essay “On Language 
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as Such and on the Language of Man,” Walter Benjamin broadly defines language as, 
“the tendency inherent in the subjects concerned—technology, art, justice, or religion—
toward the communication of the contents of the mind” (Benjamin 62). For Benjamin, 
language is not limited to words, but is rather comprised of anything that communicates 
the so-called “contents of the mind.” He suggests that the mental entity of a being, for 
which the word “consciousness” disappointingly fails to capture, must not be conflated 
with language. To this point, Benjamin posits, “The view that the mental essence of a 
thing consists precisely in its language—this view, taken as a hypothesis, is the great 
abyss into which all linguistic theory threatens to fall” (Benjamin 63). Benjamin’s 
argument complicates the idea that lacking complex language, or the ability to 
communicate the contents of one’s mind, rules out the possibility of any complex 
consciousness. Language, therefore, emerges from this mental entity rather than being 
the mental entity itself. The ideas and thoughts that are communicable become 
language, while other parts of the mental entity are essentially incommunicable and 
unknowable to others (Benjamin 63). Because of humanity’s inability to comprehend 
any part of the non-human mental entity, human language has imposed a self-
referential system of language with naming at the core. Based on the biblical precedent 
of Adam having named the world’s animals, Benjamin suggests that it is the linguistic 
being of man to name things, and in naming things, like the “fox” or “lamp,” those things 
communicate themselves to humans. Because of humanity’s domination over the 
language of naming, humans distance themselves from the non-human animal as 
separate, as that which humans have given linguistic and existential meaning. It is also 
24 
 
an act of elevation, in which the human elevates itself and establishes political dominion 
over the non-human animal, and even over the earth.  
Considering Rudy, the human infant communicates itself to its parents solely 
through the parent’s own naming, and fails to communicate anything of itself. The 
entirety of the infant’s mental entity is incommunicable in the same way that a cat’s 
mental entity is incommunicable. This appears to be the perspective of Molly in defining 
Rudy as “what was neither one thing nor the other” (Joyce 637). Nonetheless, Benjamin 
offers up a different perspective on the importance of naming in human language, one 
that fits more closely with Bloom’s understanding of Rudy’s existential status. He 
describes naming as the point where human and God meet, and in a sense, 
collaborate: 
The theory of proper names is the theory of the frontier 
between finite and infinite language. Of all beings, man is the 
only one who names his own kind, as he is the only one 
whom God did not name. By giving names, parents dedicate 
their children to God; the names they give do not 
correspond—in a metaphysical rather than etymological 
sense—to any knowledge, for they name newborn children. 
In a strict sense, no name ought (in its etymological meaning) 
to correspond to any person, for the proper name is the word 
of God in human sounds. By it each man is guaranteed his 
creation by God, and in this sense he is himself creative, as is 
expressed by mythological wisdom in the idea (which 
doubtless not infrequently comes true) that a man's name is 
his fate. The proper name is the communion of man with the 
creative word of God. (Benjamin 69). 
 
In this sense, the self-referential naming practiced on animals differs from the divine 
practice of naming humans—no name given to an infant is etymologically theirs. 
Instead, the name humans give their offspring reflect the creative powers of God, and 
instill a small part of God in the child. Being alive long enough for Bloom and Molly to 
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name, Rudy is elevated above the non-human animal by means of his name. Here, one 
sees the justification in elevating the human over the rest of the earth, in establishing 
the “communion of man with the creative word of God” (Benjamin 69). Commenting on 
Benjamin’s discussion of naming, Derrida refers to the practice as “a foreshadowing of 
mourning” in that “every case of naming involves announcing a death to come in the 
surviving of a ghost” (Derrida 389). Having some sense of this, Bloom, unlike Molly, is 
unable to fully dismiss Rudy’s significance, and goes on mourning for him while Molly 
has seemingly moved on from his death. The point at which Rudy is given a name is the 
point from which Bloom cannot retreat—he is destined from there to see Rudy as 
something worth mourning for. Acknowledging their child’s life, and necessarily his 
death, he is given the name Rudy to represent that which will eventually perish—the 
body and mind, with only the name left over to represent his place with God.  
Inspired by Benjamin, Derrida suggests that the sadness attributed to 
speechlessness, and specifically with Rudy, may not lie only with muteness, but also 
with the issue of being named. Without the knowledge of being named, one cannot 
affirm the name, or represent the name with any personality. Derrida comments on this 
added problem of naming, suggesting that, “It is true that, according to Benjamin, the 
sadness, mourning, and melancholy of nature and of animality are born out of this 
muteness, but also out of and by means of the wound without a name: that of having 
been given a name. Finding oneself deprived of language, one loses the power to 
name, to name oneself, indeed to respond to one's name” (Derrida 388). Despite the 
fact that people do not typically name themselves, there is a sense of identity lost and 
sadness gained when one cannot respond to the assigned name. In part, this is the 
26 
 
reason why Molly, in her soliloquy, cannot recognize or mourn Rudy as a fully realized, 
living being, as Bloom does. On mourning for Rudy, Molly thinks:  
I was in mourning thats 11 years ago now yes hed be 11 
though what was the good in going into mourning for what 
was neither one thing nor the other the first cry was enough 
for me I heard the deathwatch too ticking in the wall of 
course he insisted hed go into mourning for the cat. (Joyce 
637) 
 
In Molly’s estimation, Rudy was never enough of a person to mourn for, essentially 
equalizing him with their cat. Bloom, on the other hand, who is willing to interpret the 
cat’s behavior, believe his interpretations, and construct an identity for the cat, is willing 
to mourn for Rudy, and does so throughout the novel.  
Ultimately, however, there is more to their difference of opinion than a willingness 
or unwillingness to interpret. Molly and Bloom approach language in differing ways, 
causing their perception and outlook on Rudy to differ. Sheldon Brivic highlights this 
difference in his essay, “The Veil of Signs: Perception as Language in Ulysses,” in 
which he writes:  
Bloom’s visual field of desire is a perpetual drive towards 
physical images, especially voluptuous views of women. 
While Stephen wants to pass beyond the veil of natural 
appearances, Bloom is powerfully attracted to this very 
veil…He does want the veil to move or indicate the life 
principle behind it, or even, in a parody of the ideal, to fit 
snugly. When it hangs loose or shows no signs (of life), it 
becomes pure and repressive, an obstacle to contact with 
the physical world, the living veil. (Brivic 743) 
 
In contrast, Molly’s mind is not as tied to the physical world as Bloom’s is, and she 
gravitates more towards ideas and language. This is evidenced by her soliloquy, in 
which she covers a multitude of ideas, rapidly and soundly, while Bloom’s thoughts are 
27 
 
often read as slower paced and as dictated by his physical surroundings. With Rudy as 
the unclear signifier, the veil with no clear answers behind it, Molly and Bloom approach 
the signified in two opposite ways. Understanding that Rudy was too young to have a 
personality, too young to acknowledge his own existence, too young to show true 
affection, and most importantly too young to truly suffer, Molly sees Rudy signified as 
lacking meaning. She understands that grieving for Rudy would be difficult, since there 
was never a personality to grieve for. Bloom, on the other hand, still understanding 
Rudy as his son and uncomfortable without clear meaning behind the veil, finds the 
memory of Rudy “repressive” as Brivic suggests. Battling against this repression, Bloom 
sees Stephen as a surrogate for the ideas that should have been signified by Rudy, 
even as Stephen shows no signs of desiring this relationship. Tragically, because of his 
failure to connect with Stephen, the meaning behind Rudy’s veil remains empty and 
unclear, dooming Bloom to continue mourning.  
One gets the sense however, that Bloom is not entirely in disagreement with 
Molly, as he struggles with accepting the same speechlessness that causes her to 
dismiss Rudy. In the “Hades” chapter, as Bloom rides to Paddy Dignam’s funeral with 
several others, he notices another funeral procession going by with a “tiny coffin” (Joyce 
79). At this scene, Bloom thinks, “A dwarf’s face, mauve and wrinkled like little Rudy’s 
was…Our. Little. Beggar. Baby. Meant nothing. Mistake of nature” (Joyce 79). In 
referring to Rudy as a “mistake of nature,” Bloom displays his doubt about Rudy’s status 
as a human being. With nature in this context being the sort of nature referred to by 
Benjamin, including the natural world, the animal world, and the world of God, Rudy is a 
mistake. By failing to gift Rudy with the ability to acknowledge his name, or in 
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Benjamin’s words, being able to acknowledge the “communion of man with God’s 
creative word,” God has made a tragic error. Later in the novel, as Bloom notices a bat 
flying overhead, he thinks the following, “What is that flying about? Swallow? Bat 
probably…There he goes. Funny little beggar” (Joyce 309). The repetition of funny little 
beggar in this context furthers the hypothesis that Bloom is only half-convinced of 
Rudy’s human significance. Despite being unintentional, Bloom reveals that he is 
thinking about the bat and Rudy in the same mode, as something less than human. Of 
course, Bloom struggles with these feelings alone, failing himself to communicate with 
Molly. At the center of their marriage, pulling it apart, appears to be a disagreement over 
whether to attempt to mourn “what was neither one thing nor the other,” or to accept 
that one cannot mourn a being like Rudy. Though Bloom and Molly speak, their 
relationship is essentially speechless, given that both intentionally avoid the most 
important issue coming between them. Tragically, Rudy remains in the middle of the 
husband and wife, with unseeing eyes and speechless lips, smiling in ignorance of the 
tension he has created.  
In Proteus, a section almost entirely composed of Stephen’s unceasing thoughts, 
Stephen begins by considering the “ineluctable modality of the visible” (Joyce 31). 
Describing the inescapable condition of human sight, Stephen goes on to lament what 
might be perceived outside of this modality. In his essay “The Modality of the Audible in 
Joyce’s Ulysses,” Joseph E. Duncan reflects on the equally ineluctable mode of the 
audible, which is prominent in the diverse soundscape of Ulysses. Speaking to the 
diversity and ubiquity of sound in Ulysses, Duncan writes: 
29 
 
Ulysses is itself a kind of microcosm in which the varied and 
unpredictable sounds of both the outer and inner world are 
reproduced…Joyce frequently used onomatopoetic or 
imitative devices to suggest a wide variety of sounds both in 
the city itself and in the world of memory and imagination. 
Through these imitations Joyce presented the unceasing flux 
of sound as directly and immediately as possible. The range 
and potentialities of the audible are indicated by imitations 
ranging from the ‘krandlkrankran’ of the trams and the ‘tap, 
tap’ of the blind stripling to the ‘heigho’ of the church bells 
and Boylan’s ‘jingle’… (Duncan 291)  
 
In layering sounds, which are quite often banal and meaningless, throughout 
conversation and thought, Bloom faces yet another reminder that Rudy is entirely silent. 
The consequence of this silence is an erasure of Rudy from the world, both past and 
present, of remembrance and respect. Few, aside from Bloom, are thinking of Rudy as 
an individual, and none think about Rudy as much as his father does. When others do 
think of Rudy, as in the example of Stephen’s reference to “a misbirth with a trailing 
navelcord, hushed in ruddy wool,” it is indirect and in relation to Rudy’s circumstance 
rather than his being (Joyce 32). Bloom, on the other hand, frequently considers what 
his son might have become if he were allowed to live. When Boylan’s keys are jingling 
throughout the “Sirens” chapter, Bloom’s “light sob of breath” is “sighed on silent 
bluehued flowers” (Joyce 220). Aligning with the frequent allusions to Rudy’s face as 
“mauve,” and of course to Rudy’s silence, Bloom is sighing specifically about Boylan 
while also sighing generally about Rudy. Describing the role of such sounds as Boylan’s 
jingling in Ulysses, Duncan writes, “It becomes both a cause and an effect in the 
irregular sequences of psychological changes…Heard and remembered sounds result 
from, merge with, and initiate other perceptions and memories as well as feelings and 
ideas” (Duncan 293). Because sounds operate this way in Ulysses, frequently causing 
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associations of memories, feelings and ideas, it seems that the Dublin soundscape is a 
sort of hell for Bloom. Though it is not always explicitly written, the ineluctable chorus of 
the day’s sounds carry with them the reminder of Rudy’s failure to acknowledge his 
individual identity, and more gravely, to commune with “God’s creative word.” 
In the novel’s fifteenth chapter, “Circe,” Bloom enters a dream world, in which the 
rules of reality no longer dictate the events. In her essay “Changing into an Animal,” 
Maud Ellman provides an apt description of the dreamlike chapter in its relationship to 
the animal: 
In the topsy turvy dreamscape of Circe, human beings 
change places with animals and machines, each of which 
‘speaks in its own way,’ as Bloom says of the printing press 
in ‘Aeolus.’ Human superiority is exposed as a delusion, 
based on the repression of the animal and the mechanical, 
repressions that return with a vengeance in “Circe” to 
overthrow the baseless fabric of humanity. (Ellmann 3) 
 
In having everything “speak in its own way,” Joyce gradually dissolves the 
meaningfulness of human speech. Ellman suggests that the pussens’ “Mrkgnao” can be 
read as the “‘semiotic’ underside of Joyce’s novel,” further suggesting that the banal 
sounds she refers to as “wavespeech” drown out the meaning of human language 
(Ellman 5). With human language being comprised of sound, there is no immediate 
difference between a spoken word and the sound of waves crashing against the 
beach—especially in Circe (Ellman 5). The chapter, then, cultivates a space in which 
status as a human, animal, machine, or idea matters less than the passions held in 
them. In Homer’s Odyssey, Circe is a goddess who turns Odysseus’ men into swine. 
Unable to save them on his own, Odysseus is aided by Hermes, who gives him a magic 
herb called “moly.” The herb prevents him from being turned into a pig, and allows him 
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to save his men. Without “moly,” both the figurative magic herb of Hermes and Bloom’s 
literal wife, Bloom cannot resist the powers of “Circe” in the chapter. With Bloom 
occupying the body of an animal, the chapter almost dispels the idea of a reasonable 
human/animal distinction, which is what underlies the painful legacy of Rudy. As 
Bentham suggested, Derrida reiterated, and Ellman points out, “For Bloom as for 
Jeremy Bentham, it is animal’s capacity for suffering, rather than for reason, that entitles 
them to moral justice. It is also their suffering that elicits Bloom’s identification with their 
plight…” (Ellman 16). Though Bloom’s masochistic tendencies trigger some amount of 
pleasure in these scenes, he is nonetheless suffering. Unfortunately, if Bloom thinks he 
can remedy his thoughts about Rudy by acknowledging that Rudy suffered, he still has 
no way of knowing this information. When Rudy appears at the end of the chapter, he 
does not acknowledge his own suffering or the suffering of Bloom. In fact, Rudy’s 
speechlessness is relentlessly juxtaposed to the menagerie of animals, objects, and 
people who do speak in “Circe.” 
As Bloom is “caught in the act” of “cruelty to animals” by the watchmen, a group 
of gulls from earlier in the novel come to vouch for his character. In the scene with the 
gulls, Bloom passes a woman selling banbury cakes, but as he passes, he remarks, 
“Wait. Those poor birds” (Joyce 125). Seeing that the gulls are hungry, Bloom throws 
them the cakes, and thinks, “I’m not going to throw anymore. Penny quite enough. Lots 
of thanks I get. Not even a caw” (Joyce 126). Of course, the gulls cannot show 
appreciation for an act when they do not possess the concept of a kind act. Joyce later 
gifts them with the ability to acknowledge Bloom’s kindness in front of the suspicious 
watchmen, as they follow Bloom’s claim, “I am doing good to others,” with “Kaw kave 
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kankury kake” (Joyce 370). Paddy Dignam, the half-corpse, half-beagle mentioned 
earlier, also vouches for Bloom’s character. Joyce appears to be honoring animals here 
with the redemptive quality of speech, of understood experience, and of acknowledged 
kindness. Though the gift of speech given to animals and inanimate objects comes in 
chapters full of other imagined impossibilities, there is a significance to allowing them 
speech. The true issue, put so well by Rando and repeated once again here, is that “in 
a book in which even a cap and a fan can speak and in which a dog can write and recite 
poetry, Rudy Bloom is singularly speechless” (Rando 538).  
In being “singularly speechless,” Joyce sets Rudy apart from all other characters 
in the novel, animal and man. At the end of “Circe,” the screenplay-like chapter in which 
some gulls, a cap, a button, a moth, and a fan all receive lines, this is what Rudy 
receives: 
(Gazes, unseeing, into Bloom’s eyes and goes on reading, 
kissing, smiling. He has a delicate mauve face. On his suit 
he has diamond and ruby buttons. In his free left hand he 
holds a slim ivory cane with a violet bowknot. A white 
lambkin peeps out of his waistcoat pocket.) (Joyce 497) 
 
Rudy has no lines of speech, and communicates nothing concrete in his descriptions. In 
fact, in an utterly tragic moment, the stage directions describe Rudy’s gaze as 
“unseeing,” as he continues with his “kissing” and “smiling” (Joyce 497). Though Rudy’s 
actions might suggest a happy scene, his unseeing stare and mauve face suggest a 
separation and an otherworldliness—the same kind of unseeing, otherworldliness that 
humans find gazing into the eyes of animals. In his book “Reading Joyce’s Ulysses,” 
Daniel Schwarz comments on Rudy’s tragic silence in this scene: “Rudy’s ‘unseeing 
eyes’ emphasize an inevitable gulf between Bloom’s reality as a character in Joyce’s 
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Dublin and Rudy’s existence as a fiction of Bloom’s imagination” (Schwarz 227). 
Though Bloom can emerge from “Circe” in full human form, Rudy cannot. Rudy’s 
interior, unknown and impenetrable like the interior of all animals, remains an obstacle 
to Bloom’s never-ending grieving process. Even without the grief aspect, the silence 
and impenetrability itself connotes a certain sadness, taking us back to Benjamin’s 
suggestion that, “Because she is mute, nature mourns” (Rando 536). To the slight 
melancholy felt by many animal owners, Rando quotes Alice Kuzniar’s Melancholia’s 
Dog, in which she comments, "melancholia means that, however close we are to the 
canine pet, that closeness can never be enough and we are always conscious of the 
obliqueness and imperfection that govern our communion with it and, hence, of a 
fundamental muteness" (Rando 537). Due to his dying so young, only several days after 
his birth, Rudy becomes confined to this “fundamental muteness.” As a cause, Bloom 
will never know who his son was, why he got sick, or if he felt pain. Rudy, as a dead 
infant, resists the fall of Adam, which Derrida describes as the moment man transitions 
from animal to man. In a mute perpetuity, Rudy will never make the transition, which 
explains why he is denied lines in “Circe” and never given the opportunity to tell his 
father he loves him. Bloom appears determined to restore his love for Rudy in a 
relationship with Stephen—after all, as Schwarz notes, Rudy’s appearance with the 
lambkin points to the “traditional connection of child and lamb,” which is used by “one of 
Stephen’s favorite poets,” William Blake (Schwarz 228). If Stephen has somehow “taken 
Rudy’s place in Bloom’s imagination,” then he has also taken on the role of Rudy in their 
conversations—speechless and inactive (Schwarz 228).  
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Nonetheless, however speechless Stephen is in his relationship with Bloom, he 
is at least capable of expression. There is still a hope, on Bloom’s part, that Stephen will 
express himself, become mature, and find his way in the world as a man. Thinking of 
what Rudy could have been, Bloom considers, “If Rudy had lived. See him grow up. 
Hear his voice in the house” (Joyce 73). Bloom never had the privilege of truly 
considering this outcome for Rudy, and instead is forced into the occasional dream of 
“what if.” Having no understanding of Rudy’s personality or individuality, Bloom’s 
interactions with Rudy were likely closer to those with the pussens than to those with 
Stephen. This is because of the closedness and openness referred to by Agamben, in 
that Rudy is as closed to the human world of truth as Bloom’s cat is, while Stephen’s 
guarded center is still essentially open. Instead of a cat though, Rudy is representative 
of the baby lamb, or the lambkin. During Bloom’s Circe hallucination, Rudy’s lack of self-
awareness and lack of speech, combined with the symbolism of the white lambkin 
peeping out of his pocket, produce an image not unlike an aimless, innocent, grazing 
lamb. Since some infants will inevitably die very early while most survive to become 
adults, Rudy’s death signifies a holy sacrifice. He is the lamb, given over to God, so that 
Stephen and others may live long lives. If there is a remedy to Bloom’s despair and 
Molly’s indifference, it may be in considering Rudy as the sacrificial lambkin. To die as 
an infant, without having had a chance to assert himself in the world, it is difficult to think 
of Rudy’s life as anything other than meaningless. However, when thinking of Rudy’s life 
and meaning as sacrificial, he gains purpose, which would hopefully allow both Bloom 
and Molly to restructure their response to his death.  
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Though possibly unaware of it, Bloom has Rudy in mind when he ponders animal 
cruelty. On his way to Paddy Dignam’s funeral with several others, their carriage has to 
stop for a group of cattle and sheep. Of the scene, Joyce writes, “A divided drove of 
branded cattle passed the windows, lowing, slouching by on padded hoofs, whisking 
their tails slowly on their clotted bony croups. Outside them and through them ran 
raddled sheep bleating their fear” (Joyce 80). In a scene in which Bloom is mostly silent, 
Bloom remarks aloud, “I can’t make out why the corporation doesn’t run a tramline from 
the parkgate to the quays. All those animals could be taken in trucks down to the boats” 
(Joyce 80). Taken as a bit of pragmatic advice, the group agrees with Bloom. However, 
it is clear that Bloom’s sympathy for the animals surpasses his desire for a clear 
thoroughfare. This is evidenced in other places throughout the novel when he considers 
the plight of the animal, such as when he remarks, “Dead animal even sadder” (Joyce 
93). Witnessing the innocent, frightened sheep, Bloom imagines his son as one of them, 
enabling him to feel sympathy for an animal he just ate earlier that morning. The terrified 
sheep headed towards slaughter and the mutton kidneys from breakfast intersect with 
Rudy in their innocent, unquestioning sacrifice. In Lestrygonians, Bloom again wonders 
about animal cruelty in the slaughterhouse business. Surmising the moral ugliness of 
the slaughterhouse, Bloom thinks:  
Pain to the animal too. Pluck and draw fowl. Wretched 
brutes there at the cattlemarket waiting for the poleaxe to 
split their skulls open. Moo. Poor trembling calves. Meh. 
Staggering bob. Bubble and squeak. Butchers’ buckets 
wobbly lights. Give us that brisket off the hook. Plup. 
Rawhead and bloody bones. Flayed glasseyed sheep hung 
from their haunches sheepsnouts bloodypapered sniveling 
nosejam on sawdust…Ah, I’m hungry (Joyce 140). 
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By imagining the innocent sheep, fowl, and cattle being slaughtered, Bloom is 
unintentionally considering Rudy’s death and the question of Rudy’s suffering. The 
phrase “glasseyed sheep” is reminiscent of the description of Rudy’s unseeing gaze in 
Circe. The bottomless stare of the cat referenced by Derrida is the state of both the non-
human animal and of Rudy. Though the “I’m hungry” at the end might seem to run 
counter to his previous thoughts, it is the symbol of the sacrificial lamb, the thought of 
Rudy’s sacrifice, that allows him to end with such an opposing idea. While the animals 
might suffer, they will suffer for human benefit, just as Rudy assumes the place of the 
dead infant so that other infants might be healthy.  
In considering Rudy’s status as a human or animal, it is obvious that Rudy is a 
human being. Neither Molly nor Bloom seriously believe that Rudy is biologically 
anything less than human, but their differing, and sometimes aligning, perceptions of his 
ontological experience force both to consider Rudy’s existential significance. If Rudy 
lacks the fundamental attributes of the common human, whether it be the capability of 
speech, Hume’s sentiment of humanity, or some other requirement, while featuring 
fundamental attributes of nature, like closedness and speechlessness, then his true 
biological status is irrelevant. The secret in understanding Rudy’s status is his unseeing 
gaze, similar to the “bottomless gaze” referred to by Derrida. Describing this peculiar 
phenomenon of the animal, Derrida writes, “As with every bottomless gaze, as with the 
eyes of the other, the gaze called animal offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the 
human: the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say the border crossing 
from which vantage man dares to announce himself to himself…” (Derrida 381). As the 
sole speechless character in a novel where “everything speaks in its own way,” where 
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Rudy remains locked in an unseeing gaze, Rudy is neither human, nor animal, nor 
object, but a being on the limits of definition—a straddler of the border crossing. Being 
none of the above, Rudy takes on symbol of the lambkin as his primary identity. Of 
course, this is comforting for Bloom and Molly only insofar as it is accepted.  
The very confusion over how to remember Rudy, or rather, what to remember 
him as, causes the widening rift between husband and wife. Molly, comfortable with 
forgetting about Rudy and avoiding the pain of remembering, has an easier time than 
Bloom does with understanding how to mourn, or in Molly’s case, not mourn. Bloom, not 
content with simply accepting Rudy’s suspended definition of being, struggles silently 
throughout the novel, becoming more and more like his silent son. The sadness and 
grief associated with Bloom’s struggle threatens to render him speechless as well, 
evident in the many interactions and non-interactions Bloom has throughout Ulysses. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that in becoming speechless, Bloom has actually brought 
himself closer to the state of his son, and therefore closer to understanding Rudy. If 
Heidegger’s human truth begins in the world of closedness and evolves into the 
openness of the human world, then Bloom devolves throughout the episodes, becoming 
closer to Rudy.  By the end of Ulysses, readers may consider Bloom and Rudy more 
connected than ever—weeping willows, one big and one small, connected in their sad 
silence. 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Works Cited 
 
Agamben, Giorgio. The Open: Man and Animal. Stanford University Press, 2004. 
 
Arnold, Denis G. “Hume on the Moral Difference between Humans and Other 
Animals.” History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 3, 1995, pp. 303–316., 
www.jstor.org/stable/27744668. 
 
Attridge, Derrick. Ulysses: A Casebook. Oxford UP, 2003. 
 
Benjamin, Walter. Selected Writings: Volume 1 1913-1926. Harvard University Press, 
1996. 
 
Bock, Martin. “Syphilisation and Its Discontents: Somatic Indications of Psychological 
Ills in Joyce and Lowry.” Joyce/Lowry: Critical Perspectives, edited by Patrick A. 
McCarthy and Paul Tiessen, University Press of Kentucky, 1997. 
 
Brivic, Sheldon. “The Veil of Signs: Perception as Language in Joyce's Ulysses.” ELH, 
vol. 57, no. 3, 1990, pp. 737–755., www.jstor.org/stable/2873240. 
 
Burns, William E. “‘A Proverb of Versatile Mutability’: Proteus and Natural Knowledge in 
Early Modern Britain.” The Sixteenth Century Journal, vol. 32, no. 4, 2001, pp. 
969–980., www.jstor.org/stable/3648987. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. “The Animal That Therefore I Am.” Critical Inquiry 28.2 (2002). Web. 
12 May 2016.  
 
Duncan, Joseph E. “The Modality of the Audible in Joyce's Ulysses.” PMLA, vol. 72, no. 
1, 1957, pp. 286–295., www.jstor.org/stable/460230. 
 
Ellmann, Maud. “Ulysses: Changing into an Animal.” Field Day Review, vol. 2, 2006, pp. 
74–93. www.jstor.org/stable/30078637. 
 
Herr, Cheryl. “Art and Life, Nature and Culture.” Ulysses: A Casebook, edited by Derek 
Attridge, Oxford UP, 2003. 
 
Joyce, James. Ulysses. New York: Vintage Books, 1986. Print.  
 
Rando, David. “The Cat’s Meow: ‘Ulysses,’ Animals, and the Veterinary Gaze.” James 
Joyce Quarterly 46.3/4 (2009): 529-543. Web. 10 May 2016. 
 
Schwarz, Daniel. Reading Joyce’s Ulysses. London: The Macmillian Press, 1987. Print.  
 
Slote, Sam. “Garryowen and the Bloody Mangy Mongrel of Irish Modernity.” James 
Joyce Quarterly 46.3/4 (2009): 545-557. Web. 10 May 2016. 
 
